Group Defamation in England by Fryer, David R.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1964
Group Defamation in England
David R. Fryer
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
David R. Fryer, Group Defamation in England, 13 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 33 (1964)
Group Defamation in England
David R. Fryer*
T HIS ARTICLE WILL ATTEMPT to sketch briefly the extent of the
remedies in tort and the restraints in criminal law which
can be invoked in English law when defamatory matter is written
or spoken of a group of persons associated either voluntarily or
involuntarily on the basis of race, religion, vocation, political
views or in any other way.
Civil Liability
So far as liability in tort is concerned, the point usually
raised is whether an individual member of the group can recover
in an action of libel in respect of the publication of allegedly
defamatory matter concerning the group. The law on this point
was exhaustively discussed by the Court of Appeal and the
House of Lords in the leading case of Knupifer v. London Express
Newspaper, Limited' and must now be regarded as settled. The
principle to be applied was clearly stated by Lord Russell of
Killowen:
The crucial question in these cases in which an individual
plaintiff sues in respect of defamation of a class or group of
individuals is whether on their true construction the defam-
atory words were published of and concerning the individual
plaintiff. Unless this can be answered in the affirmative he
has no cause of action.2
Knupffer was the head of the British branch of a movement
called Mlade Russ or Young Russia. The party had a total mem-
bership of about two thousand, mainly in continental Europe and
the United States. The British branch of the movement com-
prised only twenty-four members. The respondents had published
a newspaper article with the object of exposing and condemning
persons and organisations in countries at war with Germany who
were supposed to favour the enemy. The article attacked the
Young Russia movement, alleging that it was a Fascist organisa-
tion and an instrument of Hitler, which would be used to over-
throw the Soviet regime in Russia by subversive means and to
* B.A., B.C.L., Oxford University; Assistant Solicitor to North Riding
County Council, Yorkshire, England.
1 (1943) K.B. 80; (1944) A.C. 116.
2 (1944) A.C. 116 at p. 123.
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establish a Fascist state in that country. The article described the
movement as "a minute body . . . established in France and the
United States." The appellant was not referred to by name, nor
did the article contain any reference to the British branch of the
movement, though it was alleged on behalf of the appellant that
the reference to a minute body would be an apt description of the
British branch.
The appellant argued that the article falsely defamed those
who were responsible for the policy of the party, and that he was
defamed in particular as the representative of the party in Britain
and head of the British branch. The court of first instance found
in favour of the plaintiff Knupffer, but on appeal this decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeal without dissent.3 Knupffer's
subsequent appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed by a
unanimous decision.4
The speeches delivered in the House of Lords set out fully
and clearly the kind of test which should be applied in this type
of case and the principle enunciated by MacKinnon L.J. in the
Court of Appeal can no longer be regarded as applicable. Mac-
Kinnon L.J. was apparently of the opinion that there was a gen-
eral principle which prevented an individual suing in respect of a
libel on a class of which he was a member, subject to certain par-
ticular exceptions. Thus he stated: 5
I think that the primary rule of law is that when defamatory
words are written or spoken of a class of persons it is not
open to a member of that class to say that they are written
or spoken of him.
As authority for this proposition he quoted a dictum of Willes J.
in Eastwood v. Holmes: 6
Assuming the article to be libellous, it is not a libel on the
plaintiff; it only reflects on a class of persons .... If a man
wrote that all lawyers were thieves, no particular lawyer
could sue him unless there is something to point to the par-
ticular individual, which there is not here.
MacKinnon L.J. stated that the principle enunciated by
Willes J. had been followed and applied in several Irish and Scot-
3 (1943) K.B. 80.
4 (1944) A.C. 116.
5 (1943) K.B. 80 at p. 83.
6 1. F. & F. 349.
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tish cases, including O'Brien v. Eason,7 where Holmes and Cherry
L.JJ. ruled that where comments of an allegedly defamatory char-
acter were made of an association called the Ancient Order of Hi-
bernians an individual member of that order who was not named
or in any way referred to could not maintain an action for libel.
He went on to specify the exceptions to this general principle in
the following words: 8
There are two further rules of law which may be said to
constitute exceptions to the primary rule that where there
is defamation of a class a member of that class cannot bring
an action. The first is that when the class is so small or so
completely ascertainable that what is said of the class is
necessarily said of every member of it, then a member of the
class can sue. The reason for that is that every member of
the class, being individually aspersed, can sue, and, therefore,
any one of them can.
MacKinnon L.J. suggested that a body of trustees, directors
or managers might fall into this category and cited as authority
Browne v. Thomson,9 to which further reference will be made.
The second exception to the general rule is that, although the
words purport to refer to a class, yet in the circumstances of
the particular case they in fact refer to one or more in-
dividual persons.
In this connection MacKinnon L.J. cited the Irish case of Le Fanu
v. Malcolmson.10
Lord Justice MacKinnon's view was not however shared by
Goddard L.J., the other member of the Court of Appeal. He
stated that the question before the court was
. . . whether the words of which complaint is made are
capable of supporting an innuendo that they refer to the
plaintiff .... 1 In my opinion, the real question is whether
the words are capable of supporting the innuendo that they
were written of and concerning the plaintiff. 12
The House of Lords were at pains to point out that only one
rule of law was involved and that special principles did not apply
7 47 Ir.L.T. 266. Also followed in Wardlaw v. Drysdale (1898), 35 Sc.L.R.
693; and in Campbell v. Wilson (1934), Sc.L.T. 249.
8 (1943) K.B. 80 at p. 84.
9 (1912) S.C. 359.
10 (1848) 1 H.L.C. 637.
11 (1943) K.B. 80 at p. 86.
12 (1943) K.B. 80 at p. 88.
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merely because the plaintiff happened to be a member of a class.
In the words of Viscount Simon L.C.: 
it is an essential element of the cause of action for
defamation that the words complained of should be published
"of the plaintiff." If the words are not so published, the
plaintiff is not defamed and cannot have any right to ask that
the defendant should be held responsible to him in respect of
them.
Lord Atkin went further in stating:14
I venture to think that it is a mistake to lay down a rule as
to libel on a class, and then qualify it with exceptions. The
only relevant rule is that in order to be actionable the
defamatory words must be understood to be published of
and concerning the plaintiff. It is irrelevant that the words
are published of two or more persons if they are proved to
be published of him, and it is irrelevant that the two or more
persons are called by some generic or class name.
Referring to the dictum of Willes J. in Eastwood v. Holmes, Lord
Atkin said: 15
His words: "it only reflects on a class of persons" are irrele-
vant unless they mean "it does not reflect on the plaintiff."
The principle which must be applied in this type of case so
far as English law is concerned is concisely expressed in Lord
Atkin's warning: 16
It will be as well for the future for lawyers to concentrate on
the question whether the words were published of the plain-
tiff rather than on the question whether they were spoken of
a class.
Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Porter were equally of
the opinion that the sole test was whether the words were pub-
lished of and concerning the plaintiff. 17 In attempting to identify
the plaintiff as the person defamed two questions are involved.
In the words of Viscount Simon: 18
The first question is a question of law-can the article, hav-
ing regard to its language, be regarded as capable of refer-
ring to the appellant? The second question is a question of
13 (1944) A.C. 116 at pp. 118, 119.
14 (1944) A.C. 116 at pp. 121, 122.
15 (1944) A.C. 116 at p. 122.
16 (1944) A.C. 116 at p. 122.
17 (1944) A.C. 116 at pp. 123, 124.
18 (1944) A.C. 116 at p. 121.
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fact-does the article, in fact, lead reasonable people, who
know the appellant, to the conclusion that it does refer to
him?
In Knupifer's Case the House of Lords decided that the ques-
tion of law as expressed above was the question that had to be
answered in all cases, irrespective of the plaintiff's membership
in a group, and that in the circumstances of that case the article
could not be regarded as capable of referring to the appellant.
It is therefore settled law that a plaintiff who alleges that he
has been defamed as a member of a class is in law in exactly the
same position as any other plaintiff who is not specifically re-
ferred to in the publication complained of. In both cases proof
of reference to the plaintiff is required. The practical question
remains-what are the chances of the individual being able to
show that the publication is of and concerning him, when he
alleges that he has been defamed as a member of a class? As
Lord Atkin stated in Knupifer's Case: 19
The reason why a libel published of a large or indeterminate
number of persons described by some general name gen-
erally fails to be actionable is the difficulty of establishing
that the plaintiff was, in fact, included in the defamatory
statement, for the habit of making unfounded generalizations
is ingrained in ill-educated or vulgar minds, or the words are
occasionally intended to be facetious exaggeration.
Though the principle relied on by Willes J. in Eastwood v.
Holmes can no longer be regarded as good law, no doubt the con-
cept of a general rule excluding recovery, subject to certain
limited exceptions, reflected the practical difficulties which plain-
tiffs encountered in such cases. Nevertheless, whether the plain-
tiff is entitled to succeed or not must depend on the circumstances
of the particular case. For an indication of the attitude of the
courts recourse must be had to Scottish and Irish decisions, since
unfortunately there is little English authority on this point other
than Knupffer's Case.
The cases indicate that there are two sets of circumstances in
which a plaintiff, as a member of a group, may succeed in proving
that the allegedly defamatory words were published of and con-
cerning him. These circumstances are in substance identical to
those which were formerly characterized as special legal excep-
tions by MacKinnon L.J. in his judgment in Knupifer's Case. The
19 (1944) A.C. 16 at p. 122.
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fact that, since Knupifer's Case, they have ceased to be legal
exceptions means that they are no longer exhaustive, and if the
plaintiff can provide proof of reference to himself in any other
circumstances he should, in principle, be entitled to succeed.
Moreover, once it is shown that the publication is of and concern-
ing the plaintiff it is immaterial that the defendant did not intend
to refer to the plaintiff or did not even know of his existence, a
point settled by the House of Lords in E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones.20
Turning to the first of the circumstances mentioned above,
where language is used in reference to a limited class it may be
reasonably understood to refer to every member of the class, in
which case every member will have a cause of action. In the
Scottish case of Browne v. Thomson 21 it was alleged in a news-
paper article that in Queenstown "Instructions were issued by the
Roman Catholic religious authorities that all Protestant shop
assistants were to be discharged." It was held that the seven
persons who exercised sole religious authority in Queenstown in
the name and on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church were
entitled to sue for libel as being individually defamed. Never-
theless, this decision was described by Lord Mackay in Campbell
v. Wilson 22 as having gone "as far as the law may safely go."
Similar English authority is provided by the old case of Fox-
croft v. Lacey.23 A suit was pending against seventeen defendants
including Foxcroft, and Lacey stated that: "These defendants
helped to murder H. F." It was held that any of these seventeen
persons could maintain an action as if they had been referred to
by name. In the Court of Appeal in Knupffer's Case, Goddard
L.J. stated: 24
The class may be so small or easily identifiable, as in the
Scottish case of Browne v. Thomson, that an attack on the
class is an attack on each member. That must depend on the
circumstances of any particular case.
20 (1909) 2 K.B. 444; affirmed (1910) A.C. 20. See also Cassidy v. Daily
Mirror (1929), 2 K.B. 331 and Youssoupoff v. M.G.M. Pictures (1934), 50
T.L.R. 581. This principle was extended in Newstead v. London Express
(1941), K.B. 377, to cover cases where defamatory statements true in respect
of A are understood to refer to B, in respect of whom they are false. The
Defamation Act 1952 Sect. 4 now provides a limited defence in cases of
unintentional defamation.
21 (1912) S.C. 359.
22 (1934) S.L.T. 249.
23 (1613) Hobart 89. See also R. v. Gathercole (1838), 2 Lewin C.C. 237.
24 (1943) K.B. 80 at p. 90.
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Goddard L.J. did not accept that special legal rules should apply
where the plaintiff is a member of a class, but he did admit that
in deciding whether the publication is of or concerning the plain-
tiff,25
To some extent, no doubt, the question of the numbers or
size of the body criticized is of great importance . . . (citing
Browne v. Thompson) .... To accuse a jury or a body of
trustees of corruption would necessarily impute corruption
to all, but to say that a political party is corrupt cannot
mean that every member of that party is accused of cor-
ruption. 26
Although the examples given by Goddard L.J. may suggesT
an arbitrary distinction, depriving members of larger groups of
rights of action which are available to members of smaller groups,
there is nothing anomalous in such a distinction if it is borne in
mind that the basis of an action of defamation is that defamatory
matter should be published of and concerning the plaintiff. It is
submitted that though the number of members in the group may
have some bearing on this issue, the courts have attached more
significance to the fact that the group has a determinate member-
ship. This seems to have been the basis of the decisions in Fox-
croft v. Lacey and Browne v. Thomson. As Lord Russell of Killo-
wen said in Knupffer's Case: 27
Or the class or group can be identified, and is such that each
member thereof is necessarily defamed. Browne v. Thomson
is an instance of this. A body of trustees or directors would
furnish another instance in which defamation of the body in-
volves defamation of each member thereof. (In the same
case, Lord Atkin stated) 2s There can be no law that a
defamatory statement made of a firm, or trustees, or the ten-
ants of a particular building is not actionable, if the words
would reasonably be understood as published of each mem-
ber of the firm or each trustee or each tenant.
Viscount Simon observed: 29
There are cases in which the language used in reference to a
limited class may be reasonably understood to refer to every
member of the class, in which case every member may have
a cause of action.
25 (1943) K.B. 80 at p. 88.
26 (1943) K.B. 80 at p. 88.
27 (1944) A.C. 116 at p. 123.
28 (1944) A.C. 116 at p. 122.
29 (1944) A.C. 116 at p. 119.
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These dicta emphasize the determinate nature of the class rather
than the number of members, and it would appear from the cases
that when the class ceases to be a determinate one in which
every member is identifiable, defamatory matter published in re-
spect of the class will cease, as a practical matter, to be regarded
as capable of referring to an individual member. Two cases
illustrate the point.
In the Irish case of O'Brien v. Eason,30 the dafamatory com-
ments complained of related to the Ancient Order of Hibernians,
which had a fluctuating membership, and it was held that indi-
vidual members of the Order, who were not referred to by name,
could not bring an action. On the other hand, in the Scottish
case of Macphail v. Macleod 31 a newspaper statement alleging
that the members of a presbytery were unfit to exercise dis-
ciplinary authority over a member of the clergy on account of
their own excesses was held to entitle each member of the pres-
bytery to maintain an action. In the Court of Appeal in Knupf-
fer's Case Goddard L.J. said: 32
Were it said that the directors of the X railway company
sweated their servants, perhaps all the directors could sue
to vindicate themselves as employers, but were it said that
the X railway company were sweaters it is absurd to suppose
that every stockholder could sue.
Lord Porter gave some indication of the importance to be at-
tached to the determinate nature of the class in stating: 33
I can imagine it being said that each member of a body, how-
ever large, was defamed where the libel consisted in the
assertion that no one of the members of a community was
elected as a member unless he had committed a murder.
Nevertheless, where allegedly defamatory matter is pub-
lished of a class, the question whether the matter is capable of
referring to the plaintiff is not conclusively determined in prac-
tice by the determinate nature of the class. To quote Lord
Porter's view: 34
30 47 Ir.L.T. 266. See also Wardlaw v. Drysdale (1898), 35 Sc. L. R. 693. Both
these decisions were based on the principle of Eastwood v. Holmes, though
in Campbell v. Ritchie (1907), S.C. 1097 (Ct. of Sess.), Lord Ardwall, in
accepting the principle followed in Wardlaw v. Drysdale, considered that on
the facts of that case the plaintiff was sufficiently identified.
31 (1895) 3 S.L.T. 91.
32 (1943) K.B. 80 at p. 88.
83 (1944) A.C. 116 at p. 124.
B4 (1944) A.C. 116 at p. 124.
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In deciding this question the size of the class, the generality
of the charge and the extravagance of the accusation may
all be elements to be taken into consideration, but none of
them is conclusive. Each case must be considered according
to its own circumstances.
These words may appear to offer little guidance to the prospective
plaintiff, but it is difficult to see what further indication the
courts could give of their attitude in particular cases once it is
accepted that the plaintiff who sues as a member of a group is in
exactly the same position in law as any other plaintiff who is not
referred to by name in the allegedly defamatory matter. The
size and character of the group is only relevant in establishing
that the publication is of and concerning the plaintiff, and groups
being infinitely various, everything must depend on the circum-
stances of the particular case.
The second type of case in which the courts have held that
an attack on a class may entitle an individual member of the
class to sue arises where defamatory matter is published which
purports to be an attack on a class but which is understood in
the circumstances of the particular case to refer to a particular
individual. This type of case is said to differ from the first type
discussed above in that, in the first type, the defamatory matter
is directed against the class itself and the individual claims that
he has been defamed as a member of that determinate class. In
the second type of case, the attack is in truth directed at the
individual and the reference to a class is merely a cloak for the
attack on the individual. The legal principle to be applied remains
constant in both types of case, though it is clear that there is even
less room for the application of special legal rules relating to
groups in this second type of case.
An example can be found in the case of Le Fanu v. Malcolm-
son,35 where a letter was published in a newspaper containing
defamatory matter attacking the owners of factories in Ireland-
clearly an aspersion on a class of persons-but in another part of
the paper there was a passage which narrowed down the locality
to Waterford, where the plaintiffs were the only owners of fac-
tories. It was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed
since, in the words of Lord Campbell: 36
* . . whether a man is called by one name, or whether he is
called by another, or whether he is described by a pretended
85 (1848) 1 H.L.C. 637.
86 (1848) 1 H. L. C. 637 at p. 668.
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description of a class to which he is known to belong, if those
who look on, know well who is aimed at, the very same
injury is inflicted, the very same thing is in fact done as
would be done if his name and Christian name were ten
times repeated.
Lord Campbell took the opportunity to criticise the view that
special rules should apply in the case of a class of persons: 3 7
The first objection is that this libel applies to a class of per-
sons and that therefore an individual cannot apply it to him-
self. I am of opinion that that is contrary to all reason and
is not supported by any authority.
From these words it can be seen that the question whether the
publication refers to the plaintiff is answered in exactly the same
way as it would be in any other case where the plaintiff is not
referred to by name and the plaintiff's membership of a class is
immaterial.
It would therefore appear that in English law the same prin-
ciple will be applied whether the plaintiff alleges that he has been
defamed by matter which makes no reference to him by name
or to any class of which he may be a member, or that defamatory
matter purporting to be an attack on a class to which he belongs
is merely the cloak for a defamatory attack on himself, or that the
publication of a defamatory attack on a class of which he is a
member entitles him to sue as being individually defamed as a
member of that class.
If the individual members of the group cannot be said to
have suffered any injury requiring redress in tort, any claim for
redress can only be in respect of the damage caused to the repu-
tation of the group as such. The group as such, however, cannoi
bring an action since the only entities recognised by the common
law as having a right to sue in any action are individuals, corpo-
rations and registered trade unions.
It is well settled that a trading corporation can maintain an
action for libel-South Hetton Coal Co. v. North-Eastern News
Association.3 In truth such a corporation, being a creature of
law, has no reputation which can be injured by a defamatory
attack. The reputation that is injured by such an attack is really
37 (1848) 1 H. L. C. 637 at p. 667.
38 (1894) 1 Q.B. 133. In D.&L. Caterers Ltd. and Jackson v. D'Ajou (1945),
K.B. 364, it was held that a trading company could sue for slander affecting
it by way of its trade.
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the reputation of the members or other agents who conduct the
business of the corporation, but, by attacking their reputations in
this way damage may be caused to the corporation itself in re-
spect of its business and property. In the South Hetton Case it
was stated, per Kay J.39 that a trading corporation "has a trading
character, the defamation of which may ruin it." Thus a trading
corporation can recover damages for injury caused to its "trading
reputation" if it can be shown that the matter complained of has
a tendency to cause actual damage to the corporation in respect
of its business.
It has been held that an allegation that the management of a
trading corporation is incompetent (Metropolitan Saloon Omni-
bus Co. v. Hawkins)40 or that the board of such a company is
composed of alien enemies in time of war (Slazengers Ltd. v.
Gibbs & Co.)41 entitles the corporation to sue. Similarly in the
South Hetton Case42 it was held that an attack on a coal mining
company, alleging that it failed to provide decent sanitary ac-
commodation for its workmen and their families, could tend to
injure it in the way of its business.
A group or unincorporated association of persons cannot sue
for defamation since they are not legal entities. Nor can the
individual members sue in a representative action for an attack
on the group itself. As Fletcher Moulton L.J. said in Markt v.
Knight: 43
No representative action can lie where the sole relief sought
is damages, because they have to be proved separately in the
case of each plaintiff, and, therefore, the possibility of repre-
sentation ceases.
It is, therefore, not open to the officers or members of an associa-
tion to bring an action for defamation of the association. Thus, in
Jenkins v. John Bull Ltd.,41 in an action for libel brought by the
president, treasurer and secretaries of the Salford Civic League
39 (1894) 1 Q.B. 133 at p. 145.
40 (1859) 4 H.&N. 87. Certain dicta by Pollock C.B. at p. 90, and by Lopez
L.J. in the South Hetton Case (1894) 1 Q.B. 133 at p. 143, suggest that a
trading corporation cannot sue for libel in respect of an allegation of cor-
ruption. It is submitted that these views are not supported by authority.
See Hill v. Hart Davies (1882), 21 Ch. D. 798.
41 (1916) 33 T.L.R. 35. See also Lyons v. Lipton (1914), 49 LJ. 542.
42 (1894) 1 Q. B. 133. It is not necessary to prove that the corporation has
actually suffered damage since this is presumed: Irish Peoples Assurance
Co. v. Dublin City Assurance Co. (1929), 1 R. 25.
43 (1910) 2 K.B. 1021 at p. 1040.
44 The Times, April 20th, 1910.
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of Help, "on behalf of themselves and all other members of the
said League," Phillimore J. struck out those parts of the state-
ment of claim which related to all the other members of the
League.
No doubt, if the individual members could prove damages
separately in the case of each of them they would rely on the
principle of Knupffer's case and allege that they were indi-
vidually defamed by an attack on the group of which they were
members, but they would not have any right to bring an action
on behalf of the group to recover damages for injury to the
reputation of the group. Even a corporation which can sue in its
own name will be unable to recover in an action of libel unless it
can establish that it has a reputation in respect of which it has
suffered loss. It is on this principle that non-trading corporations
cannot in general bring actions for defamation.
Thus in Manchester (Mayor of) v. Williams45 it was held
that the absence of a trading character prevented a municipal
corporation from suing for a libel charging it with corruption
and bribery in the administration of municipal affairs. The cor-
rectness of this decision was doubted in Willis v. Brooks,46 but
it is still binding on a court of first instance. In such a case the
only persons who have a cause of action are the individual agents
of the corporation who have been defamed.
Nevertheless a non-trading corporation can sue if it can show
that the libel tends to its pecuniary damage. Thus in Bourne v.
Marylebone Corporation47 it was held that where a municipal
corporation possessed statutory powers to trade, e.g., by supply-
ing electricity, it had a trading reputation in the exercise of those
powers. As a statutory legal entity, a registered trade union can
sue in its registered name. The transaction of business by such a
union in connection with the holding and management of prop-
erty has been held to create a reputation similar to that of a
trading corporation which entitles the union to sue for a libel
which tends to affect its financial position, e.g., by reducing its
subscription income.
48
45 (1891) 1 Q.B. 94. See also D.&L. Caterers and Jackson v. D'Ajou (1945),
K.B. 364 at p. 367, where du Parcq L.J. stated "A company cannot sue either
for libel or for slander unless it is defamed in the way of its business."
46 (1947) 1 All. E.R. 191.
47 (1908) W.N. 52.
48 N.U.G.M.W. v. Gilliam (1946), 1 K.B. 81; Willis v. Brooks (1947), 1 All.
E.R. 191 (allegation of ballot-rigging).
Jan., 1964
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss1/6
GROUP DEFAMATION (ENGLAND)
Though these principles have been discussed primarily in
relation to libel, they are equally applicable to actions for slander
in respect of verbal utterances. The Report of the Committee
on the Law of Defamation, published in 1948, stated that the
Committee considered whether to recommend the creation of
civil liability for group libel which it understood as meaning the
vilification of groups or classes of persons distinguishable by
race, colour, creed or vocation, but decided against it.49
Criminal Liability
It would be a mistake to conclude that defamatory state-
ment concerning a group or class of persons can be made with
impunity so long as the statement does not give rise to a cause
of action on the principle of Knupffer's Case. The criminal law
can impose its own restraints on such statements. Though slander
is not a crime, 50 one must consider first the law of criminal libel
properly so called, and secondly the law of sedition, which covers
both the uttering of seditious words and seditious libel.
Criminal libel is a common law misdemeanour 5 1 and pro-
ceedings are usually commenced by indictment on a summons,
though in rare cases proceedings can be taken by way of a
criminal information granted at the instance of the Attorney-
General. This latter method is usually resorted to only when the
libel relates to the holder of some public or judicial office. Civil
and criminal remedies for libel are available concurrently, though
as a general rule criminal actions should only be brought where
there is some element of public concern in the proceedings, or
where the libel is frequently repeated or particularly aggravated,
or where for one reason or another a civil action is not avail-
able. 52
The basis of criminal libel is its tendency to lead to a breach
of the peace, and this accounts for some of the differences in the
matters to be proved in the civil and criminal actions. Thus it
is not necessary to prove publication to a third person in crimi-
49 (1948) Cmd. 7536, paras. 30-32. In his article in Current Legal Problems
(1952) 178, Lloyd states that "English law takes the view that if you only
contrive to spread your vilifications sufficiently widely you may do so with
impunity."
50 R. v. Penny (1697), 1 Ld. Rayn. 153.
51 Libel is not a criminal offence in Scotland: Richardson v. Wilson (1879),
7 R. 237.
52 R. v. Wicks (1936), 52 T.L.R. 253.
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nal proceedings for libel53 and indeed an indictment will lie for
a defamatory statement about a dead person. Moreover, since
criminal proceedings are technically carried on by the Crown,
and since the overriding concern is to restrain the publica-
cation of defamatory matter which might lead to a breach of the
Queen's Peace, an indictment will lie for the defamation of a
group or body of persons.54
Criminal law therefore affords a protection which is not
available under civil law. The group as such has no cause of
action in tort; the only right that is available is the right of an
individual member of the group to bring an action if he can show
proof of reference to himself. The criminal law restrains defam-
atory libels not only on individuals but also on groups as such.
Archbold suggests that:
Writings reflecting upon bodies of men are indictable as libels
only if some individual is directly or by implication libel-
led.55
This would be to apply the principle of Knupffer's Case to the
criminal law. It seems sufficient, however, that the class defamed
be a determinate one. For a member of a group to maintain a
civil action for libel in respect of words written of that group, he
must show that the words are published of and concerning him.
This may be done, as in Browne v. Thomson,56 by showing that
he is a member of an ascertainable group and that words written
of the group necessarily refer to him.
Proof of reference to the individual member of the group is
not the crucial question in criminal proceedings, and the protec-
tion of the criminal law is really afforded to the group as such,
the only proviso being that the group should be ascertainable.
Criminal proceedings will lie if the tendency of the words is to
arouse angry passions in the body or group libelled or in the
general public against the body or group libelled, and so lead to
a breach of the peace.5 7 In the old case of R. v. Osborne5s the
defendant wrote that "certain Jews lately arrived from Portugal
53 R. v. Adams (1888), 22 Q.B.D. 66.
54 R. v. Gathercole (1828), 2 Lewin C.C. 237.
55 Pleading Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases, 35th Ed. 1962, p. 1404
s. 3631.
56 (1912) S.C. 359.
57 R. v. Wicks (1936), 52 T.L.R. 253.
58 (1732) 2 Swanst. 503n.
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and living near Broad Street" had burnt a Jewish woman and
her child because the child had a Christian father. It was proved
that several Jews who had recently arrived from Portugal and
lived at Broad Street had been violently attacked by a mob, and
the court overruled an objection that no criminal information
lay because it did not appear who in particular the persons re-
flected upon were. Similarly, in R. v. Williams,9 a criminal in-
formation was granted in respect of a newspaper libel reflecting
on the clergy of a particular diocese and generally upon the
clergy of the Church of England, though no individual prosecu-
tor was named.
It would seem from these cases that the interest of the
Crown in restraining conduct which might lead to a breach of
the peace may afford protection to a group even though the in-
dividual members cannot be definitely ascertained. Much de-
pends on the circumstances of the particular case and it is prob-
ably safer to say that the publication of defamatory matter con-
cerning a large indeterminate group would remain unrestrained
by the law of criminal libel and without any remedy in tort.
Nevertheless, since the aim of the Crown is to preserve the peace,
the courts may be less ready to regard defamatory matter as
being merely vulgar abuse than they would be in civil proceed-
ings, where the claim is based on damages for an injured repu-
tation.
Slander is not a criminal offence, so that defamatory words
spoken of a group cannot give rise to criminal proceedings, 60 un-
less the slander is of a seditious nature."' Both spoken and writ-
ten words may be criminal if they are of a seditious nature, since
the law of sedition includes the offences of uttering seditious
words and seditious libel.
The law of sedition could be invoked in suitable cases to re-
strain and punish the defamation of racial, ethnic, religious, polit-
ical and perhaps vocational groups even though their member-
ship might be quite indeterminate, though its exact scope at the
present time is in need of clarification.62 It would, of course, be
59 (1822) I Dow. & Ry. 197. See also R. v. Burdett: 4, B. & Ald314.
60 R. v. Bear, 2 Salk 417.
61 Criminal proceedings will also lie if the words are blasphemous-Bow-
man v. Secular Society (1917), A.C. 406, or obscene-R. v. Barraclough
(1906), 1 K. B. 201.
62 It is no defence to prove that the statements are true, or that they are
made for the public benefit.
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a mistake to regard it as appropriate in the case of every defama-
tory attack on such groups. Moreover, many other types of
groups or associations which are denied the benefit of either civil
or criminal proceedings for libel would be quite inappropriate
objects for protection under the law of sedition.
The most generally accepted definition of a seditious intent
is to be found in Sir James Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law: 63
... an intention to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite
disaffection against the person of, His Majesty, his heirs or
successors, or the government and constitution of the United
Kingdom by law established, or either House of Parliament,
or the administration of justice, or to excite His Majesty's
subjects to attempt otherwise than by lawful means, the
alteration of any matter in Church or State by law estab-
lished, . . . or to raise discontent or disaffection amongst His
Majesty's subjects, or to promote feelings of ill-will and hos-
tility between different classes of such subjects.
Notwithstanding the law of sedition, it is the right of every citi-
zen to discuss freely, fully and candidly any matter of public
concern, and the law will not interfere unless such interference
is absolutely necessary for the preservation of society. 4 Thus,
to "point out, in order to their removal, matters which are pro-
ducing, or have a tendency to produce, feelings of hatred and ill-
will between classes of His Majesty's subjects, is not a seditious
intention." 65
Honest discussion and criticism on these lines is permissible
so long as such discusion is not directed to the incitement of un-
lawful acts or calculated to excite disaffection.66 In times of great
political upheaval in the past, particularly in the eighteenth Cen-
tury, prosecutions for sedition were fairly frequent but are now
rare.
It is submitted, however, that such a prosecution could be
an appropriate weapon for use in the case of certain offensive
attacks on groups, since an attack on a group or a class of per-
sons, vilifying them on account of their race or religion, can
clearly promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between differ-
ent classes of subjects. Whether it amounts to sedition will de-
63 8th Ed. Art. 114.
64 R. v. Sullivan, 11 Cox C.C. 44.
65 Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law, 8th Ed., Art. 95.
66 R. v. Burns (1886), 16 Cox 355.
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pend on the circumstances of the particular caseG7 and the state
of public feeling at the time must be taken into account. s
The present limitations of this offence are exemplified by the
recent unreported case of R. v. Caunt, which was decided in 1947.
A newspaper editor had attacked British Jewry in particularly
virulent terms, and the jury acquitted the defendant after a di-
rection from Birkett J. that it must be shown that the libel was
published with the intention of promoting violence. Even allow-
ing for the rule that a person must be taken to intend the natural
consequences of his actions, it would seem that at present only
the most extreme attacks, in which the necessary intent is mani-
fest, will result in a conviction.
In recent years there has been considerable agitation for
the enactment of measures which would make the incitement of
racial hatred a special statutory offence separate from the law
of sedition. Though Bills for this purpose have frequently been
laid before Parliament, the government has consistently resisted
such pressure, maintaining that the existing law is sufficient to
cope with such conduct. The pressure for such an Act at the
present time is largely due to the disgust felt by most people at
the activities of the British Union of Facists. This numerically
insignificant movement attracts attention on account of the dis-
orders which frequently occur at its public meetings. It is the
practice of the movement at these meetings to make outrageous
statements concerning Jews and Negroes. These statements are
of so offensive a nature as to provoke persons attending the meet-
ing to prevent their repetition by forcibly bringing the meeting
to an end. The government has some justification for its view
that a special Act prohibiting the incitement of racial hatred is
unnecessary, if it is merely required to deal with the activities of
the British Union of Facists and kindred organizations.
Apart from the provisions of the comon law relating to un-
lawful assemblies, 9 this particular type of conduct can be dealt
with by the Public Order Act, which was passed in 1936 primarily
to deal with the disturbances caused by Communist and Fascist
movements at that time. The effective section for this purpose is
Section 5 which provides:
67 R. v. Burns (1886), 16 Cox 355.
68 R. v. Aldred (1909), 22 Cox 1.
69 Beatty v. Gillbanks (1882), 9 Q.B.D. 308.
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Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting
uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour
with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a
breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty
of an offence.
This section was in fact invoked in 1962 in connection with dis-
turbances arising at one of the meetings of the British Union of
Fascists. Colin Jordan, one of the leaders of the movement, made
a number of highly offensive and provocative statements to the
effect that Hitler had been correct in his attitude to the Jews.
The meeting broke up in complete disorder and Jordan was sen-
tenced to two months imprisonment by the magistrates' court.
His appeal to Quarter Sessions was upheld on the ground that
the language used was not likely to lead reasonable people to
commit breaches of the peace by physical assaults. On appeal by
case stated to the Divisional Court the appeal was allowed and
the case remitted to Quarter Sessions with instructions to con-
vict.70
In his judgment, Lord Parker C.J. stated that he could not
"imagine any reasonable citizen, certainly one who was a Jew,
not being provoked beyond endurance, and not only a Jew but a
coloured man." 71 Lord Parker, however, regarded this as im-
material for the purposes of the Public Order Act:
. . . there is no room here for any test as to whether any
member of the audience is a reasonable man or an ordinary
citizen ... (the speaker) must take his audience as he finds
them, and if those words to that audience or that part of the
audience are likely to provoke a breach of the peace, then
the speaker is guilty of an offence. 72
This case seems to establish a wide liability for offences un-
der the Public Order Act and may lead to an effective restraint
in the future on public utterances of the British Union of Fascists,
particularly since the government has undertaken to review the
penalties for offences under the Act.
Though the Public Order Act may be adequate to deal with
the more notorious group attacks which occur at public meetings,
it does not apply to the publication of written defamatory state-
ments, or to oral statements which are not made in "a public
70 Jordan v. Burgoyne (1963), 2 W.L.R. 1045.
71 Jordan v. Burgoyne (1963), 2 W.L.R. 1045 at p. 1047.
72 Jordan v. Burgoyne (1963), 2 W. L. R. 1045 at pp. 1047, 1048.
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place." The law of sedition is wide enough to cover such state-
ments if they contain an incitement to violence, but it is a clumsy
weapon to use as presently defined. It has been suggested7 3 that
the common law offence of sedition should be brought up to date
and placed on a statutory footing and should clearly include
incitement to religious and racial hatred. It would then be un-
necessary to pass a special Act relating to racial incitement.
Religious or racial groups would then be protected against oral
or written attacks, whether made at meetings or otherwise, since
sedition embraces the offences of uttering seditious words and
seditious libel.
Even if this statutory recasting of the law of sedition were to
take place, instances would still occur of defamatory statements
concerning groups in respect of which the individual or the group
would have no civil redress; nor would the law of criminal libel,
or the law of sedition extended as suggested, provide a restraint.
Does this not result inevitably from the fact that the basis of the
civil claim is the damage caused to the reputation of the person
of whom the defamatory statement is published, and because the
prime concern of the criminal law is to prevent conduct which is
likely to lead to a breach of the peace? It may seem unfortunate
in the particular case that there is no effective method of restrain-
defamation of a group, but if the reputation of an individual or
other legal person is not damaged and the peace is not threatened,
is there a case for establishing liability for such statements? It is
surely another reminder of the fact that not every cause of com-
plaint gives rise to a cause of action. Some friction in daily life is
inevitable; the law must draw the line in deciding when this
friction has reached the permitted limit.
73 By R. E. C. Jewell in Justice of the Peace and Local Government Review,
May 4th, 1963 at p. 269.
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